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Flag on the Plag:.
~m

25 to Life for the Offense of

murder

by Sean Bukowski
O

n November 16, 1999, an unknown assailant shot 24-year-

a.
old Cherica Adams four times in a heinous drive-by shooting)

A month later she died from these gunshot wounds. 2 At the
time of the shooting, Ms. Adams was six-and-a-half months
pregnant. According to police, Carolina Panther Rae Carruth
was the father of this baby. 4 Based on further evidence involving Carruth's connection to the assailant, the district attorney
charged him with first-degree murder. 5

This NFL star now

sits in jail accused of murder and facing a possible death sentence.
Carruth is not the only athlete charged with committing violent crimes. It seems every day we read about an athlete getting arrested for beating his wife 6 or getting into a barroom
brawl. 7 News and sports reports almost run together so that
it is difficult to tell which is which.

During the 2000 Super

Bowl week, NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue admitted that

s or-S n, te
player-committed crime has become a critical issue for
8

the NFL.

Indeed, this problem is evident in all profes-

sional sports leagues.
Whether the athletes like it or not, children do look up
to them as role models. Society does not want its role
models committing violent crimes. Moral concerns aside,
this is a vital matter for the individual leagues since
their profitability and sustainability depend on it. 9 As its
players continue to commit violent crimes, a league's
image is tarnished and its profitability is endangered.
Baltimore Ravens' owner Art Modell admitted that as the
number of NFL players who are charged with crimes
10
rises, the NFL's advertising revenue could decline.
This statement from Modell occurred during the same
week he testified as a character witness for the Ravens'
Pro Bowl linebacker Ray Lewis during Lewis' bail hearing for felony murder.1 1 After testifying, Modell concluded that if the NFL suspended everyone who committed a
misdemeanor, each team would only have about four
players eligible to play.12

ciences in the leagues' means of dealing with violent
crime, including the ways in which current policies and
programs might be unfair to players.
Finally, the Note will explore some options for the
leagues to consider in attempting to handle player-committed crime. It will argue that the leagues are in a better position to discipline the players than are teams or
players' associations due to obvious conflicts of interests.
Leagues are concerned only with their health. For this
reason, many leagues, either through collective bargaining agreements 18 or official policies, 19 have given their
commissioners the power to discipline players for off-thefield actions. However, rather than relying on amorphous powers vested in league commissioners, the Note
will call for definitive processes established for the ultimate benefit of the leagues. teams, players, and even the
fans. Also, it will suggest that the real focus of future discussions should be on measures aimed at the prevention
of violent crimes by educating and rehabilitating players,
not by simply kicking them from one team to another.

There are many other issues surrounding athletes and
criminal law besides just violent crime. Certainly, many
athletes have had problems with drugs and bouts of petty
mischief. 13 However, violent crime committed by anyone, especially athletes, has a damaging effect on society.1 4 When someone commits a violent crime, everyone
in the community has their stability and sense of safety
threatened. 1 5 Violent crime also rips at the moral fabric
of society.

16

This effect, coupled with the increased expo-

sure of athletes committing these crimes, is why this
Note limits its analysis to violent crime.
This Note will consider the extent to which the "professional athletic" community should add its own sanc-

ARE ATHLETES COMMITTING
MORE VIOLENT CRIMES?
A number of athletes have been charged with violent
crimes in recent years.

In 1995, perhaps the most

famous murder trial in United States history took
place. 20 Hall of Fame running back O.J. Simpson was
accused of murdering his wife and Ron Goldman outside
of his wife's condominium. 2 1 In addition, the prosecution
accused Simpson of beating his wife for seventeen
years.22

O.J. Simpson is far from the only athlete charged with

whether athletes are getting into more trouble than in
the past, as it is possible that athletes are just following

committing violent crimes, however. Heavyweight boxer
Mike Tyson has been convicted of raping a woman in
Indianapolis 2 3 and assaulting motorists after a minor
traffic accident. 2 4 More recently, Baltimore Ravens' line-

a trend of society, and thus are no more prone to violence
than anyone else. 17 Nevertheless, violent crime, espe-

backer Ray Lewis plead guilty for obstructing justice in a
murder case; 2 5 Rae Carruth was arrested for allegedly

cially that committed by role models like athletes, is
especially damaging to society. Therefore, the Note then

conspiring to murder his ex-girlfriend; 2 6 three New York

tions to those imposed by public law.

First, it asks

addresses why the sports leagues should care whether
their athletes are committing such offenses.
It will then examine how the individual major sports
leagues-the National Football League (NFL), Major
League Baseball (MLB), the National Hockey League
(NHL) and the National Basketball Association (NBA)are currently addressing the problem of athletes and violent crime. Particular attention will be given to the defi-

Jets were arrested for a barroom
brawl; 2 7Indianapolis Colts' defensive
back Steve Muhammad allegedly
assaulted his pregnant wife; 28 St.
Louis Rams' linebacker Leonard
Little killed a woman while driving
drunk; 2 9 New England Patriots tight
end Ben Coates and outfielder Wil
Cordero both allegedly assaulted their
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and, of course, running back Lawrence Phillips
31
continued to amass a long history of criminal problems.
wives;

Since the end of the 1999 football season, the NFL alone
32
has had thirty-eight players arrested.
With all of the media attention that athletes draw, it is
debatable whether there are actually more cases of athletes committing violent crimes, or whether the coverage
of the accusations has just made it more visible. Athletes
are high-profile public figures. As they draw higher
salaries, they garner more media attention. With this
increased scrutiny, every aspect of an athlete's life,
including any crime he commits, is spotlighted. Thus,
what seems like a greater number of athletes committing
violent crimes could simply be a function of increased
media coverage of those athletes committing crimes.
Regardless of whether athletes are committing more
crimes than in the past, the fact is they are committing
crimes relatively often. In a special report in Sports
Illustrated,William Nack and Lester Munson found that
male college athletes are
responsible for a significantly higher percentage
of the
assaults

reported
on

sexual

Division

I

campuses than the rest of
the male student population. 3 3

KO iSK
especially strong when children see the relatively light
sentences that athletes sometimes receive and the corresponding lack of consequences for their professional
careers. 3 9 A child might get the impression that there
are limited consequences to violent crimes, and that
therefore it is permissible to commit them.
For both the players and the teams, the athlete's
crimes can directly affect profitability. Many teams now
use athletes to entice fans into buying tickets. 40 Players
participate in Pro-Am golf tournaments, call season-ticket holders on the phone, and parade in front of fans on
their way to the locker room. 4 1 If and when fans replace
admiration with disgust as a result of the actions of certain players, the star quality of athletes ceases to be a
useful commodity for the league. NFL Commissioner
Paul Tagliabue is deeply concerned about the image that
NFL players who commit a lot of violent crimes are projecting and the influence that image can have on the
42
league's profitability.
Players themselves also
lose money when they
commit violent crimes.
They can make tremendous amounts of money by
becoming spokesmen for
43
advertising campaigns.
But corporate America

Some people suggest that athletes might be more prone to violent acts off
the field because of the violent behavior they display on
the field. 3 4 After all, athletes are trained to use violence
and intimidation, and they may have difficulty separating that behavior from their personal relationships. 35 In

likes to sign wholesome, heroic athletes to endorsement
deals. 4 4 Thus, keeping a positive public image is financially important to the player, whose endorsement deals
45
depend on a good name and a clean record.

locker rooms, it is commonplace for athletes to boast
about physically and sexually aggressive behavior
towards women. 3 6 The pursuit of dominance lies at the
heart of all athletic contests, and this quality may be the
37
same force behind many violent crimes.

chance after chance. 46 In professional sports, everything
revolves around winning. 4 7 Thus, even if an athlete has
a troubled past, many teams are willing to give that athlete second, third, and even fourth chances, hoping he

Aside from the danger these crimes pose to the victims, violent crime by athletes has other harmful effects
Professional basketball player Charles
on society.
38
Barkley once stated that he was not a role model.
However, whether Barkley accepts it or not, he cannot
ignore the fact that many children see athletes as largerthan-life heroes to emulate while watching the games.
This adoration could be difficult to shed during the other
When an athlete commits a violent
crime, the child could possibly emulate that act, just as
they cheer a fierce hit on the gridiron. The danger is
days of the week.

Despite all of the incentives to distance themselves
from criminal athletes, teams continue to give athletes

can help them win. Lawrence Phillips is a perfect example. He is the sixth all-time leading rusher in University
of Nebraska football history.48 In 1994 alone, he rushed
for 1,722 yards. 4 9 But while at Nebraska, he also
excelled in deviant behavior, getting himself convicted of
assaulting his girlfriend 50 and charged with drunk driving. 5 1 Despite this, the St. Louis Rams rewarded him by
selecting him in the first round of the NFL draft and
52
signing him to a three-year contract worth $5.6 million.
The Rams eventually released him after a subsequent
drunk-driving conviction. 5 3 The Dolphins then signed

S Or S n te
him, but they also released the troubled star after additional disciplinary problems. 54 The San Francisco 49ers
gave him yet another chance in the NFL. 5 5 Continued
disciplinary problems eventually led to his release from
56
his third NFL team.
The lesson is clear. Phillips' promise on the field compensated for crime after crime. Teams wanted to win, so
they overlooked all of the negative consequences that
came with this talent. Talent wins games; it also buys
second chances.

TRADITIONAL METHODS FOR
DEALING WITH ATLETECOMMITTED VIOLENT CRIME
The Phillips example shows why leaving the discipline
of players who commit violent crimes to the teams is an
ineffective solution. The better option would be for the
leagues to control the athletes. Traditionally, the power
to discipline players for their off-field conduct has rested
in the hands of the commissioner of the league. This
power comes from the individual league's constitution.
However, with the proliferation of athletes committing
crimes, some leagues have introduced more stringent
policies. For example, the NFL has introduced a Violent
Crime Policy; the NHL has a Behavioral Health
Program. Whether other leagues will follow these examples is unknown.
SOURCES OF LEAGUE POWER
Individual Player Contracts
All of the major sports leagues have standard player
contracts. 5 7 In these contracts, the players must agree to
a number of provisions, including disciplinary provisions. 5 8 Ingrained in these contracts generally is a pro59

vision relating to the player's conduct.
For example, in
the NHL's standard player contract, a player has to agree
to conduct himself to the highest standards of honesty,
morality, fair play, and sportsmanship. 6 0 The player also
must refrain from conduct detrimental to the best inter61
ests of the sport.
It is unclear what a team could do if a player violates
this provision of his contract. However, at the minimum,
if the player violates a provision of his contract, the club
could void the contract and release the player. This ability allowed the Golden State Warriors to release Latrell
Sprewell after he choked his coach, P.J. Carlesimo. 6 2

The Collective Bargaining Agreementand Public Law

both Contract

All of the major sports leagues have provisions in their
collective bargaining agreements that allow their commissioners to discipline an athlete if that athlete violates
any league rules.63 Commissioners also guard the "best
interests of the sport. ' 64 For example, NBA policy allows
the commissioner to suspend or fine a player if the player violates the NBA Constitution or the NBA/NBPA
65
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The scope of a commissioner's power was first revealed
in 1919 when Boston Red Sox pitcher Carl Mays walked
off the field in the middle of a game. 66 Soon after, the
Red Sox sold Mays to the New York Yankees. 67 When
American League President Byron "Ban" Johnson
learned of this sale, he immediately suspended Mays for
deserting the Red Sox. 68 The Yankees challenged this
action in American League Baseball Club of New York v.
Johnson. 6 9 In that case, the Court ruled that Johnson
only could discipline a player in the performance of his
duties, which it defined as the power to regulate the actu70
al playing of the game on the field.
After the Black Sox Scandal of 1919,71 baseball decided to unite its two leagues under one commissioner,
Kenesaw Mountain Landis. 7 2 Landis accepted the position only after the league agreed to give him broad powers as commissioner to discipline players in the best
interest of the game. 7 3 In Milwaukee American Ass'n v.
74
Landis, the Supreme Court upheld these broad powers.
The Court showed great deference to the commissioner
by holding that it was solely his decision what was in the
best interests of baseball. 75 This strong power has been
a mainstay of MLB commissioners with the exception of
a short period when the commissioner did not use his
broad powers to discipline players. 7 6 However, the last
two decades have seen a resurgence in the commissioner's power. 7 7 In Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, the
court upheld Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's right to determine whether an act is in the best interest of baseball. 78
This continues to be within the scope of the commission79
er's powers.
This basic structure of commissioner-initiated discipline is the same in all of the other major sports
leagues.8 0 How the leagues invoke this power to deal
with athletes who commit crimes, however, varies quite
dramatically. The NFL and NHL have instituted individual policies outlining specific instances where the
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the NBA, THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
and
MLB
power.
his
commissioner will invoke
The NBA has no specific policy governing violent
on the other hand, allow the commissioner to discipline
players whenever the "best interests" of the game are at crimes committed by players. Like MLB, the NBA punishes players through its Constitution and a clause in the
risk.
standard player contract. 90 This clause gives the commissioner the sole power to fine or suspend any player
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
Major League Baseball has not set up any special policies to deal with violent crime. MLB has continued to
punish players via a provision in the Major League
Agreement and Collective Bargaining Agreement
81
This provision allows the
Standard Player Contract.
commissioner, in his discretion, to punish athletes if they
violate the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
82
and also the League Agreement.
MLB has suspended players in the past for off-field
conduct that is detrimental to the game. For instance, in
1997, MLB suspended Boston Red Sox outfielder Wil
83
MLB commissioners
Cordero for assaulting his wife.
have also repeatedly used the power to suspend players,
84
and Steve Howe, 8 5 for
including Darryl Strawberry
drug abuse.
The clout of the players' association makes it uncertain
whether MLB could enact a violent crime policy similar
86
However, the MLB
to the one enacted by the NFL.
commissioner has been very active in suspending players
for conduct that is detrimental to the game of baseball,
87
per his power in the Major League Agreement.

91
Players
who violates any clause of either document.
92
may however appeal any decision to an arbitrator.
In addition to the general powers of the commissioner,
the NBA contract also has a "good moral character
clause." 93 Under this clause, if a player does not conform
his personal conduct to standards of good morals and cit94
This is
izenship, the team can terminate his contract.
precisely what the Golden State Warriors did in 1997
95
After Sprewell
with their star player, Latrell Sprewell.
choked his coach, P.J. Carlesimo, the Warriors voided
Sprewell's contract for breaching the good morals and cit96
In addition to the
izenship clause of his contract.
Warriors' termination of Sprewell, the NBA suspended
Sprewell for a year based on the "best interests" rationale. 9 7 Due to double jeopardy concerns, an arbitrator
eventually dismissed the NBA's suspension of

Sprewell. 9 8

NEW METHODS FOR DEALING
WITH ATHLETE-COMMITTED
VIOLENT CRIME

Recently, MLB owners voted unanimously to expand
Commissioner Bud Selig's powers to unprecedented levels. 8 8 With these new powers, Commissioner Selig may
take any action he deems appropriate to ensure competitive balance in baseball. 89 Surely this includes the power

Like MLB and the NBA commissioners, the commissioners of both the NFL and NHL can discipline players
99
However, instead of
in the "best interests" of the game.
relying solely upon these vague powers, these leagues
have gone beyond this provision of their constitutions

to suspend and/or fine players for committing violent
crimes. It is not too difficult to conclude that violent
crime is detrimental to the league in general. When a
player commits a violent crime, it upsets the competitive
balance by depriving some teams of the services of play-

and enacted specific policies to deal with their players
The NFL has a Violent Crime
committing crimes.
10 0
the NHL has enacted a Behavioral Health
Policy;

ers. In addition, the bad publicity could damage the
team's profitability, which can affect the team's possibility of signing free agents. Thus, violent crime could possibly lead to an upsetting of the competitive balance.
With the new powers the League granted to
Commissioner Bud Selig and the effectiveness of pro-

THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
The NFL seems to be the most progressive league in
taking steps to eliminate player-related violent crime. In
1998, the League instituted a new Violent Crime
Policy.102 This policy allows the league, specifically the

grams in other leagues, MLB could enact a stronger and
more clearly defined anti-crime policy.

Program.1 0 1

commissioner, to suspend and/or fine an athlete for being
10 3
In addition, the
charged with any crime of violence.
Violent Crime Policy requires the accused player to
undergo counseling and clinical evaluation.104

sc;orts nte
This policy raises two important questions. The first
is whether a league should punish people for a violent
crime before a criminal court determines the player's
guilt. With the NFL's policy, the commissioner can suspend and/or fine a player as soon as he is charged with a
violent crime. 10 5 Certainly the state can abridge a person's rights prior to adjudication in the criminal courts,
through incarceration, bail requirements, or similar reg-

missioner. 117
Despite its ambiguity, the policy sends a clear message
to the players that the NFL will not tolerate criminal
activity. And in its relatively short history, the NFL's

ulatory means. 10 6 However, when the state does this, it
is generally in pursuit of legislatively ordained interests,

Violent Crime Policy has affected numerous players.
Situations ranging from Minnesota Vikings' safety
Orlando Thomas' alleged domestic abuse1 18 to Rae
Carruth's first-degree murder indictment 1 9 have
prompted investigations by the NFL. Commissioner
Tagliabue also invoked the policy when he fined San

such as to assure that the accused will show for trial or
to protect society against any further dangers. 10 7 When

Francisco 49ers running back Lawrence Phillips at the
beginning of the 1999 season. 12 0 Tagliabue ruled that

the NFL chooses to suspend and/or fine a player before
conviction, it looks much more like premature punishment. This runs contrary to our fundamental assump-

Phillips would be fined his first four weeks of pay for
pleading guilty to an assault outside a South Florida
nightclub in 1998.121

tion of innocence until guilt is proven. A player should
not be suspended and/or fined until he has been convict-

The NFL, through its Violent Crime Policy, has taken
steps to curb the violent crimes committed by its play-

ed of the crime, or at least been given some due process
by the league. This way the player will be given at least
the appearance of fairness. When a person believes that

ers. 122 The policy gives the commissioner greater power
12 3
to discipline players accused of violent crimes.

he is being treated fairly, he is much more able to accept
the final discipline and rehabilitation. 1 08
Second, though the NFL's policy gives some examples
of what might constitute a "violent" crime, it does not
provide a specific definition. 10 9 Moreover, the examples
are given "without limitation." 11 0 Thus, outside the few
examples the policy lists, it is unclear what else might
compose a "violent" crime. According to the Cambridge
American English Dictionary, a "violent action" is a forceful action that is intended to hurt a person or is likely to
cause injury. 111 However, the United States Criminal
Code defines a violent felony to include burglary and
other crimes creating a serious risk of injury. 11 2 So while
the NFL's Violent Crime Policy would clearly apply to
Rae Carruth, who was charged with first-degree murder, 113 it is unclear whether the policy would include
Cecil Collins, who was charged with a single count of
burglary. 114

This discrepancy creates too much uncertainty under
the NFL's policy. Clearly, no athlete should put himself
in a position where he might be subject to the policy.
However, where exactly is that point? According to the
NFL's policy, the commissioner has sole discretion to punish an athlete if he violates the policy once. 115 It would
appear that the commissioner also has the sole discretion
to determine what constitutes a violation. 116 If the player violates the policy twice, however, the NFL automatically suspends him for a time determined by the com-

However, there are still problems with the policy, which
the NFL needs to address.
THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
In addition to a "best interests" clause in the National
Hockey League Constitution, 12 4 the NHL also has a
Behavioral Health Program. 125 This program allows the
NHL to require players to attend counseling sessions if
they have a history of criminal behavior. 126 The decision
to require counseling is solely in the commissioner's discretion and is not reviewable by an arbitrator.127
Discipline

under

the NHL's

Behavioral

Health

12 8

Program has four different stages.
In stage one, the
NHL treats the player through counseling but does not
enforce any other penalty. 129 In stage two, treatment is
continued in the counseling program, but the league can
also suspend the player without pay.130 In stage three,
the league automatically suspends the player for six
months. 13 1 Finally, in stage four, the NHL suspends the
player without pay for one year with no guarantee of
reinstatement. 132
The commissioner originally assigns the player to the
Behavioral Health Program. 13 3 Once the player is in the
program, the administering physicians determine when
a player should move from one stage to another. 13 4 It is
unclear what criteria they use to make such a determination. 1 35 When discussing NHL player Kevin Stevens'
recent arrest for drug-related crimes, a program administrator stated that when a player gets into trouble, the

SAN B
physicians evaluate the player's previous progress in the
program and then use their professional judgment to
determine whether they should move a player from one

KO SK
NHL's, 14 7 then there is at least a better probability that
the players will go on to become better citizens and better athletes.

13 6

stage to another.
The NHL and the Players' Association developed the
Behavioral Health Program to have more of a "family"
appeal by involving a player's family and teammates in
the counseling. 137 The motto of the program is that the
NHL itself is a family. 138 The program also treats the
13 9
It does not focus on deterplayers through education.
rence through threat of sanction, but rather through education, so that the players do not commit future
crimes.140
The NHL originally created the Behavioral Health
14 1
and it
Program to be a substance abuse program,
mainly functions in this capacity. Currently, the NHL
does not seem to be too concerned with violent crime,
since, according to an NHL official, violent crime is not
1 42
However, there is
widespread among hockey players.
evidence of the program's usefulness in dealing with violent crime. Nashville Predator Sergei Krivokrasov pled
guilty to a 1992 assault of a woman in Minnesota, and
1 43
He now
the NHL required him to enter the program.
14 4
attends regular therapeutic meetings with doctors.

PROBLEMS WITH LEAGUE

PUNISHMENT POLICIES
All of the leagues' current policies dealing with athletes committing violent crimes have problems. In particular, MLB's and the NBA's use of the commissioners'
power to discipline in the "best interests" of the game are
problematic.
First, relying on this power does not directly inform
the player what kind of behavior is intolerable. The disciplinary power is solely the commissioner's. Therefore,
where one player is disciplined, another may escape punishment entirely-despite identical offenses. A definitive
policy would clear up any confusion.
Second, relying solely on the commissioner's powers
does not guarantee a player due process. As stated pre1 45
viously, due process is essential to maintain fairness.
In addition, due process gives the appearance of fairness,
which helps to rehabilitate the player. 146
Finally, rehabilitation can be an essential part of a violent crime program. Both the league and society have a
vested interest in rehabilitating these athletes so they
don't commit more violent crimes. If there is a process
set to counsel and educate the players, similar to the

DUE PROCESS CONCERNS OF THE POWER TO
DISCIPLINE
Unilateral Actions by the Commissioner under the "Best
Interest" Clauses
As previously stated, all four major sports leagues
have provisions in their respective constitutions and collective bargaining agreements which allow the commissioner to discipline players for conduct against the best
interest of the sport. 1 48 The decision on whether to sus14 9
pend or fine a player is solely up to the commissioner,
based on his own investigation. The only warning the
player might get is a notice of the investigation and some
limited discovery rights. 150 Similarly, the only significant safeguard for the player is the right to appeal the
15 1
decision of the commissioner to a neutral arbitrator.
This arbitration determination can be appealed, but
152
courts grant the arbitrator's decision great deference.
This lack of protection of players' rights raises questions of fairness. The questions may even implicate constitutional concerns inherent in the Due Process Clause
15 3
The Constitution
of the United States Constitution.
requires the government to give due process to an indi15 4
Generally, courts
vidual whom they accuse of a crime.
have not applied the Due Process Clause to private
155
employers who wish to discipline employees.
However, when a private employer deals with a union in
a collective bargaining agreement, the employer is generally held to some substantive and procedural due
process standards. 15 6 For example, when a union

employee, whose employer has disciplined him, appeals
to an arbitrator, the arbitrator applies a due process
15 7
If an employer
rationale to the employer's actions.
fails to meet due process requirements, most arbitrators
1 58
will refuse to sustain the discipline.
Most arbitrators give a limited meaning to the due
process required in the workplace, which is commonly
called industrial due process. 15 9 For example, an arbitrator will not hold an employer to strict criminal due
process. 16 0 This extreme protection is reserved for the

criminal realm because incarceration is a much more
severe punishment than workplace discipline.161
Essentially, the decision for an arbitrator in employeremployee disputes focuses on whether the process was
16 2
If the arbitrator
fundamentally fair for the employee.

s or s n te
feels that the employer has complied with the spirit of
due process and management's failures to comply with
certain procedures did not prejudice the employee, the
arbitrator may uphold the discipline. 16 3 However, industrial due process still requires that the accused is given
not only sufficient notice, but also the opportunity to
present evidence, and that the
determination is based on the
evidence presented.164 In addition, industrial due process may
require employers to investigate
1 65
a matter thoroughly before disciplining an employee.
In sports, by the time a player gets to appeal to an
arbitrator, the commissioner already has made a unilateral decision. 1 6 6 Even though the arbitrator tries to be
neutral, there may be some presumption of guilt based on
the commissioner's findings. An arbitrator might think
that the commissioner would not have taken action
unless the player committed the offense. Thus, there

individual who administers it. 174 This diminishes his
chances for successful rehabilitation. 17 5 This problem
of due process, however, is not limited to the NFL.
The NHL's Behavioral Health Program does not
adhere to any real due process standards either.
Similar to the NFL's Violent Crime Policy, the NHL's

l

program is implemented solely
on the decision of the commissioner, who alone determines
176
placement in the program.

Unlike the NFL, however, this
decision is not appealable to an arbitrator. 17 7 Once
the player is in the program, his progress through the
four stages is left to the sole discretion of the doctors. 1 7 8 The player has no input in these decisions
removed from his progress as evaluated by the doctors. 1 79 Moreover, there is no standard process set up
to govern a player's progress.

may be a real concern as to whether the player is getting
due process.

Departures from due process can result in arbitrary
rulings. 18 0 Without consistent procedures in place,
players have no guarantee that they will be disciplined in the same manner for the same crime. 18 1 An

WIDE RIGHT: NFL AND NHL Miss THE MARK
The stakes are even higher in the NFL, where according to the Violent Crime Policy, the commissioner can

arbitrary decision by a commissioner can be extremely devastating to the psyche of the player and the
goodwill of the fans. The player may not understand

essentially act as judge, jury, and executioner. 16 7 This
raises some very serious questions about an athlete's
right to defend himself against accusations. The fact

why a fellow player receives a lesser punishment for
what seems like a greater crime. In addition, fans
may become disillusioned by such disparity in punish-

that a private employer has more liberties in disciplining
an employee than a public employer does not mean that
a private employee should be devoid of any protections
from a private employer. 16 8 Due process protects individuals from an abuse of authority.169 Without it, there

ment-recall fan confusion when Atlanta Braves'
pitcher John Rocker was suspended for thirty days for
non-criminal, albeit racist speech, 1 8 2 while Colorado

is no guarantee that an accused is getting a fair investigation. 170 Due process also serves a rehabilitative function, partly ensuring that a person does not commit these
171
crimes again.
When an individual commits a crime, part of the aftermath should ideally be an attempt to rehabilitate the
individual.
The NFL, in its Violent Crime Policy,
attempts to rehabilitate individuals through counseling
and clinical evaluation. 1 72 The policy mandates this
counseling any time a player is even charged with a violent crime.1 7 3 Since the commissioner can determine
when and how a player should be disciplined before a
court determines guilt, the player may not feel like he is
being treated fairly. If a player perceives injustice, he is
likely to resent the "punishment" handed down and the

Rockies pitcher Pedro Astacio, who pled guilty to beating his wife, received no punishment at all from baseball. 18 3 The risks are especially prevalent when commissioners discipline players according to their powers to uphold the "best interests" of the game. At least
in the defined policies, like the NFL's Violent Crime
Policy, there are some guidelines as to how and when
punishment will occur.
Ex POST FACTO IMPLICATIONS
An ex post facto law poses punishment on an act that
was not punishable when the act was committed. 18 4 The
United States Constitution specifically prohibits ex post
facto laws. 1 8 5 Granted, the United States Constitution
only applies to the government, not to private institutions. But the spirit and political philosophy embodied
therein may well justify a wider application at times.

S ANB
Unilateral Actions Under the "Best Interest" Clauses
When a commissioner decides to discipline a player
under the "best interest" clause, he makes a unilateral
decision to do so. 18 6 There is no guidance in the clauses
to determine when a commissioner may invoke it. This
has led to seemingly inconsistent applications, such as
when Boston Red Sox outfielder Wil Cordero was sus7
pended for abusing his wife, 18 while Colorado Rockies
pitcher Pedro Astacio received no discipline from baseball
18 8
for very similar acts.
Since there is this incongruity in punishments, it is
very difficult for a player to understand what type of conduct is contrary to the best interests of the sport. Thus,
the player has no warning when the commissioner might

KO0SK "
only for actions that would fall under the NFL's Violent
Crime Policy, but also for Phillips' history of indecent behavior. If one of the NFL's objectives is to rehabilitate the
offenders, as it would seem to be, 200 then the commissioner
20 1
should not be punishing for past acts.
The NFL's Collective Bargaining Agreement allows the
commissioner to punish a player if that player commits an
act detrimental to the league.20 2 Because of this, it can be
argued that Phillips, and others like him, had notice of the
commissioner's power to suspend under the Violent Crime
Policy and were not harmed by an ex post facto rule.
However, the power of the commissioner is ill-defined, and

discipline

the Violent Crime Policy goes well beyond any punishments
available to the commissioner in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For example, the Violent Crime Policy requires

an unfair, ex post facto action.

counseling when the player is accused of a violent crime, as
well as an automatic suspension when convicted of a violent
crime. 2 03 This includes cases where the player pleads
20 4
These
either to a lesser crime or pleads nolo contendere.
rules are not stated in the commissioner's powers under the

The reason the United States
him.
Constitution outlaws ex post facto laws is because they
18 9
Since a commissiondo not give people fair warning.
interests" clause is
"best
a
er's unilateral action under
not clearly defined and comes without warning, it may be

The NFL Violent Crime Policy has not Alleviated this
Problem
Lawrence Phillips has pled guilty to abusing his for190
In spite of these
mer girlfriend and to DUI charges.

Collective Bargaining Agreement. Thus, Lawrence Phillips
might not have been suspended or fined when he pled to the
DUI and assault cases. Under the new policy, though, he is
automatically subject to the commissioner's fine or suspension.205

actions, the San Francisco 49ers, prior to the 1999 NFL
19 1
Prior to joining
season, signed Phillips to a contract.
the 49ers, however, NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue
required Phillips to meet with him to discuss Phillips'
troubles. 192 Tagliabue then fined Phillips for pleading
guilty to a misdemeanor assault outside of a South

The policy also allows the NFL to punish players for
20 6
crimes committed while they were not in the league.
This, in effect, is another ex post facto rule where the NFL
seeks to hold the players accountable for rules they had no
reason to suspect applied to them.
The stated purpose of the NFL's Violent Crime Policy is

This assault happened while
Florida nightclub. 1 93
Phillips was a member of the Miami Dolphins and after
194
the NFL had passed its Violent Crime Policy.
However, Tagliabue judged Phillips on all of his past
crimes while at the University of Nebraska and in the
NFL. 19 5 Since Tagliabue has such tremendous power

that the prohibited conduct would be detrimental to the
integrity of the league. 20 7 Violent conduct alienates the
20 8
fans and tarnishes public confidence in the league.
However, when the NFL punishes a player for acts committed before entering the league, the player can be equally
damaged. The NFL's policy could hurt contract negotiations

under the policy, he can essentially act as judge, jury, and
executioner. 196 Thus, Phillips had no choice but to accept
Tagliabue's punishment if he wanted to play in the NFL

and limit the player's options in signing with a team. If he
is going to be subject to an immediate suspension, very few
teams might want his services. Thus, this penalty could go
well beyond the intended punishment. In such a case, the
NFL is not only suspending him for committing his crime,

again.
19 7
They do not
Retroactive laws are generally unjust.
give an individual warning as to what can be punWhen Commissioner Tagliabue punished
ished. 19 8
Lawrence Phillips through the NFL's Violent Crime
Policy, he did not give Phillips a warning that his past
199
He nevertheless
transgressions were punishable.
fined Lawrence Phillips a substantial sum of money not

but also might actually be prohibiting him from reaching his
full salary potential or from playing altogether. Moreover,
the punishment effectively becomes a condition of employment; if the player wants to sign a contract, he must accept
the punishment. This is exactly what the league did with
Lawrence Phillips. 20 9
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PUNISHMENT

OF A

PLAYER

MIGHT

Jeopardy

Dilemma

Under

Unilateral

VIOLENT

CRIME

POLICY MAY

INTERFERE

Plea bargaining is an integral part of the criminal
judicial process. 2 2 3 Without plea bargaining, it is quite

Commissioner Action
In

NFL's

WITH JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Double

THE

industrial due process, an arbitrator will often

possible that the judicial system would collapse under

limit on discipline. 2 10 Often this means that an employ-

the weight of too many trials. 2 2 4 Thus, plea bargaining
allows for resolutions in criminal cases that might never
22 5
come about otherwise.

er may not punish an employee more than once for the

Some league policies, especially the NFL's Violent

same offense. 2 11 In professional sports, it is quite possi-

Crime Policy, could discourage a player from pleading to

ble that this double jeopardy clause could bar both a

a lesser charge offered by the prosecuting attorney. The

team and a league from punishing a player separately for

policy subjects the player to discipline even if he pleads

interpret

a

"just cause" provision to mean that an

employer is subject to some sort of "double jeopardy"

a single offense.

A player can be suspended with pay

pending an investigation, if the league and team are
clear that the original suspension is a precursor to future
punishment. 2 12

However, if a team suspends a player

without pay, and then the league further suspends that
player, this could constitute double jeopardy.2 13 The original suspension is one punishment, the subsequent suspension another-and both for only one action by the
player.

2 14

It also

subjects the player to discipline if the player pleads down
to a

lesser crime after he was accused of a violent

crime. 2 27 Thus, players might be discouraged from plea
bargaining because they know it inevitably leads to sanctions from the NFL, regardless of his punishment from
the state. Instead, he could decide that it is better for
him to go to trial and take his chances than automatically subject himself to the NFL's punishment.
This is troubling for a number of reasons. If the NFL

This is one of the reasons that Latrell Sprewell's suspension by the NBA was not sustained by an arbitrator.2 15

guilty or nolo contendere to a violent crime. 2 26

Immediately after the choking incident, the

Golden State Warriors started an investigation, which
was joined by the NBA. 2 16 Soon thereafter, the Warriors
suspended Sprewell for ten days. 2 1 7 When the NBA then
wanted to further suspend Sprewell, the arbitrator ruled
that this violated double jeopardy.

2 18

discourages plea bargaining, it could damage the judicial
system by causing more cases to go to trial. 2 2 8 When a
case goes to trial, it costs both the player and the government tremendous

amounts of time and money.

Despite the relatively small number of athlete criminal
cases, such cases often require substantial effort and
resources due to their high profile nature. Causing these
cases to go to trial also can damage the NFL. Trials can

Double jeopardy can also be invoked when an employ-

often become long, drawn out occurrences with heavy

er immediately disciplines an employee and then further

media scrutiny. This publicity may damage the NFL's

disciplines him after a subsequent investigation. 2 1 9 For

image, even if the player is acquitted.

example, if the Warriors had suspended Sprewell for ten

Similarily, since prosecutors rely heavily on plea bar-

days, then after further investigation, decided the sus-

gains, they sometimes bring greater charges than the

pension should last a full season, this would amount to

conduct warrants in order to entice the accused to plead

2
multiple punishments for a single infraction.

20

guilty to the appropriate charge. 2 29 Under the NFL's policy, however, a player might be more inclined to fight the

Double Jeopardy in the NFL
Under the NFL's Policy, a player simply accused of a violent crime is automatically placed into counseling and
evaluation.

22 1

If he is then convicted, he is automatical-

ly suspended. 22 2 This suspension could be considered a
second punishment for the same crime, and thus double

charge in hopes of gaining an acquittal rather than automatically subjecting himself to NFL discipline.

prosecutor has overcharged, this decision to go to trial
could subject the athlete to more severe punishment than
the case actually warrants.
Such potential for interference with the judicial plea

jeopardy. The first punishment is the forced counseling;

bargaining system was evident in

the second punishment comes when the league suspends

Florida

the player.

If the

the 1999 case of

State University (FSU) wide receiver

Peter
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policies also need to have more uniformity of punishments and better notice provisions so that players,
teams, and fans alike know what to expect.
The NFL and NHL's policies might not be perfect, but

2 30

Warrick was charged with felony grand
Warrick.
231
He was ready to accept a negotiated plea that
theft.
would reduce the charge to a misdemeanor and require
him to serve thirty days in jail after the football season. 23 2 However, before Warrick could accept the plea,
FSU President Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte told
reporters that he did not like the idea of a player playing
2 33
for FSU with a jail sentence yet to be served.

at least they offer something. The NFL's Policy may not
be working as well as Commissioner Tagliabue thinks it
is, 23 7 but certainly having a policy at all signals a recognition of the problem of violent crime and an attempt to
deal with it. Thus, the NBA and MLB should follow their

D'Alemberte stated that Warrick must get all of his troubles with the criminal justice system behind him before
he could play for FSU again. 2 34 Because of this, Warrick
went back to the district attorney and negotiated a new
235
deal that did not include any jail time.

fellow leagues' lead and enact some sort of violent crime
policies-bearing in mind the concerns detailed below.
THE INHERENT UNFAIRNESS
LEAGUES

The additional penalty that D'Alemberte was going to
levy on Warrick directly

The current NFL and
NHL policies need some

interfered with the judicial
process. In this instance, it

As addressed
changes.
above, they are potentially
unfair to the players and

benefited

eventually

Warrick by allowing him to
avoid jail time. However,
the interference is not good
for society. We entrust our
government officials to
make fair plea bargains. If
the bargaining process is constrained by outside interference, this decreases the chances for an equitable solution.
The interference also can severely limit a player's possiFortunately for
bility of attaining a plea bargain.
Warrick, the district attorney was willing to accept a plea
where Warrick did not serve jail time. However, if he was
not willing, the university's threat of additional suspension could have precluded Warrick from accepting a plea.
This is the same type of interference that the NFL's
Violent Crime Policy involves when it subjects players to
the policy if they plead down a violent crime.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE MAJOR
SPORTS LEAGUES
THE

NBA

AND

MLB

SHOULD ADOPT A VIOLENT CRIME

POLICY
Currently, neither the NBA nor MLB have any definitive proposals in place to deal with athletes who commit
violent crimes. Both of these leagues rely solely on the
power of the commissioner to discipline players in the
"best interests" of the game. 2 3 6 As previously discussed,
there are numerous problems with relying solely on these
powers. The leagues need to address the growing public
concern over athletes committing violent crimes. These

OF THE POLICIES OF THE

may undermine the players' faith in the system and
their potential for rehabilitation. 2 3 8 For example, the
Baltimore
fined
NFL

I

Ravens' linebacker Ray Lewis $250,000 for obstructing
justice in a murder investigation 2 3 9 while they suspended Jumbo Elliot entirely for fighting in a bar.2 40 These
kinds of inconsistencies can undermine an effective poliIn addition, fining players like Lawrence Phillips
before he even has a contract or a chance to address the
situation 2 4 1 can discourage the player and reduce his
chance to become a productive person and athlete. For
cy.

these reasons, the leagues' policies should be amended.
First, all the leagues should implement more due
process measures. For example, whenever a player is
subject to discipline for violent activities, he should be
allowed to present a defense to the commissioner. The
player should have a right to an attorney and be able to
present extenuating circumstances or defenses in his
favor. This would allow the player to receive a fair hearing, and hopefully, a fair judgment. Such a result would
2 42
be more effective in rehabilitating the player.
The NFL also should modify its stance on considering
a player's prior acts when punishing the player. 2 4 3 Past
crimes are not admissible in a courtroom; they should not
be considered here. 2 4 4 At the minimum, there should be
some safeguards implemented to consider a player's
rehabilitation since the previous crimes. Simply having

s or s nte
the commissioner evaluate the player is not enough protection.
The NFL also should wait until a player is convicted
before disciplining him through the Violent Crime

However, therapy and counseling can help get to the root
258
of the problem.
The professional sports leagues make a tremendous
amount of money from the athletes involved. 2 59 In
return, the athletes are paid large salaries. 26 0 To ensure
that the money continues to flow, athletes have to take
responsibility for their actions and stop committing vio-

Policy.24 5 In the United States, a person is innocent until
proven guilty; this presumption should not be abandoned
upon entering the NFL. Additionally, the NFL should not
take such a negative stand on plea bargains. 24 6 By sub-

lent crimes. However, it is also in the leagues' best interests for the athletes to stop committing crimes. To protect the profitability of both the leagues and the players,

jecting the player to punishment for lesser pleas, the
League discourages him from making a plea bargain in a
criminal court. This is detrimental to the player and to
the criminal justice system as a whole.

the leagues should take measures to counsel its players
on violent crime.

THE FOCUS OF THE POLICIES SHOULD BE ALTERED

THE LEAGUES

The NHL's Behavioral Health Program has taken a
very progressive and novel approach to dealing with violent crime. 2 4 7 By insisting on counseling in a family

THEIR JUDGMENTS

SHOULD BECOME MORE

DEFINITIVE IN

Lawrence Phillips has had numerous chances in the
NFL. 2 6 1 As stated previously, he is an exceptional athlete, and exceptional athletes get second and third

environment, the NHL is attempting to rehabilitate the
player to make him a more productive member of socie-

chances. However, the multiple opportunities supplied
to Lawrence Phillips send conflicting messages
throughout the league. It says to any player, if you are

ty.2 4 8 This is the focus that all of the leagues should take.
In the opening of the NFL's Violent Crime Policy, the
league states that since crime alienates fans, the policy

good enough you can do anything you wish, for even if
caught, the NFL will give you a second chance.
There are undoubtedly numerous violent actions

was enacted to protect the NFL's image. 2 4 9 This reasoning is understandable. The owners have a tremendous
amount of money invested in their teams, 2 50 and it is logical for them to want to protect that investment by protecting the public image of the NFL. However, there may

that go completely unpunished by the NFL. 2 62 Players
often brag about things such as their physical conquests of women in locker rooms. 2 6 3 Having these
actions go unpunished also sends a negative image to
the players since leagues rarely, if ever, take action

be more effective ways of doing so.
The NHL policy embodies such an approach.
Everything from the name of the program (the
Behavioral Health Program) 2 51 to the remedies institut-

until the government spurs them to it. Even when a
league does act, it seldom keeps an athlete away from

ed 2 5 2 suggest that the NHL
is interested in getting to
the root of the problem and

the game for long.

trying to prevent future
crimes. When the NHL subjects a player to its
Behavioral
Health
Program, the ultimate solution is treatment. 2 5 3 The League concentrates on sending the player to counseling in order to stop the violent
behavior. 2 54 They do withhold the right to punish, of
course, but choose to give preference to rehabilitation. 2 55

messages.

Essentially, the league is
sending the players two
One, don't get
caught. Two, if you do get
caught, the league will give
you repeated chances as
as you are a good
enough player. These messages do not help alleviate
the violent crime problems.
In their policies, the leagues must send assurances
that if caught, regardless of talent, a player will be
.....
.long .

The NFL should realize, as the NHL has, that there is
a lot of value in the rehabilitation of its stars. 2 5 6 If a
player has the talent, teams are always going to be willing to sign him. 2 57 Certainly, fines and suspensions can

punished. A blanket system of punishment should be
introduced. This would cover any player who commits
a violent crime. It should not matter if that player is
an All-Star or a bench warmer. When a superstar is
punished in the same way that a backup is punished, it

work to help deter an athlete from committing crimes.
17
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shows all the players that no one is above the law. This
would send a message that the league is serious about
not tolerating violent crime.

THE FOURTH QUARTER
26 4
It has
Violent crime permeates present day sports.
a rippling effect that goes beyond the sports arena. It
damages society by deflating the emulation children give
athletes. These children grow up with tarnished images
of their heroes and may come to accept criminal activity.

To combat these problems, the professional sports
leagues must have a definitive policy in place. The cur26 5
and NFL 2 66 are not
rent policies in place by the NHL

enough; lack of any policy in MLB or the NBA is, at best,
irresponsible. All of the leagues should implement new
policies to deal with these problems. The strength of the
players' associations will make this a difficult process,
but the future of sport and the health of society depend

is time to put away petty differences and help solve a
growing epidemic.
The policies need rigid standards, which afford full
due process protections to the accused. They also should
not interfere with the criminal process through plea bargaining. 26 7 The focus of the policies should be on rehabilitation. The leagues want talented players and the
fans want to see talented players. To ensure that these
players are playing, counseling and treatment should be
available to them. When a player does commit a crime,
however, the league should punish him fairly and evenly.
Current league policies make combating violent crime
an almost insurmountable task. However, violent crime
committed by athletes is not an insolvable problem.
Viable solutions require better plans and greater attention. The sporting world has never been a stranger to the
latter; the struggle now becomes channeling that
resource to the former.
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